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 In 1968, Congress passed the Williams Act as a response to 
the increased use of cash tender offers as a means for achieving 
corporate takeovers.1 The purpose of the Williams Act was to ensure 
that public shareholders were provided adequate information about the 
qualifications and intentions of third parties making cash tender offers 
or acquiring large blocks of shares in publicly held companies as a 
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1 Piper v. Chris-Craft Ind. Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977); The Williams Act 
amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78m.  
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means to possibly contest company control.2 Prior to enactment of the 
Williams Act, there was a “gap” in federal regulation in that tender 
offers and acquisitions of substantial amounts of stock having a 
potential for control were not subject to registration and disclosure 
requirements as were corporate acquisitions by proxy solicitations or 
by exchange offers of securities.3 In particular, Section 13(d) of the 
Williams Act was largely intended to alert shareholders of a large 
accumulation of stock by a party that may potentially affect control.4 
Accordingly, any person who acquires more than 5% of a class of 
registered equity security must send to the issuer and the exchanges on 
which the security is traded, and file with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”), a Schedule 13D indicating their intent with 
regards to such acquisition.5 Specifically, Section 13(d)(1) requires the 
disclosure of: (A) the background and identity of the persons filing, 
(B) the source and amount of funds for any purchases, (C) any 
potential plans to assert control over the issuer, (D) the number of 
shares owned and (E) information concerning any arrangements or 
understandings with any person with respect to any securities of the 
issuer.6      
 While the Williams Act did not contain an explicit private 
right of action, courts soon held that such an implied right existed.7 
The existence of an implied right of action under Section 13(d) has not 
                                                 
2 Ind. Nat’l Corp. v. Rich, 712 F.2d 1180, 1183 (7th Cir. 1983); S. Rep. No. 
550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967). 
3 Ind. Nat’l Corp., 712 F.2d at 1183 (“Whereas corporate acquisitions by proxy 
solicitations or by exchange offers of securities were subject to registration and 
disclosure requirements, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n, 77e, tender offers or acquisitions of 
substantial amounts of stock having a potential for control were not subject to 
similar requirements”).   
4 Id.; 113 Cong. Rec. 854 (1967); see also H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 4 (1967). 
5 Securities Exchange Act § 13(d)(1); Rule 13d-1; 17 C.F.R. § 440.13d-101.   
6 See Securities Exchange Act § 13(d)(1). 
7 Ind. Nat’l Corp., 712 F.2d at 1183 (Additionally, the Williams Act was 
modeled after Section 14(a) which contained also contained a private right of 
action); see Gen. Time Corp. v. Talley Ind., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1968), 
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969). 
2
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been questioned by any court since the enactment of the Williams Act 
in 1968.8 In contrast, Section 13(d)’s standing requirements and the 
context in which such a private right exists have created conflict 
between courts. In the Seventh Circuit, in particular, there exist two 
viable, yet divergent holdings relating to the scope of Section 13(d)’s 
implied cause of action. Accordingly, the issues addressed in this note 
include: (1) the scope of Section 13(d)’s implied cause of action; (2) 
whether the Seventh Circuit unnecessarily narrowed Section 13(d)’s 
implied cause of action through its holding in Edelson v. Ch’ien, 405 
F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2005) thereby creating a potential split between 
circuits; and, (3) the Edelson holding’s implications with respect to 
corporate governance and, in particular, its possible chilling affect on 
the heightened corporate governance requirements set forth in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 et seq.. 
 Section I of this Note provides background regarding the 
Williams Act. Section II analyzes and explains Indiana National Corp. 
v. Rich, the Seventh Circuit case decided in 1983 adopting Section 
13(d)’s implied cause of action. Section III discusses the recent 
Seventh Circuit decision, Edelson v. Ch’ien, which presented the first 
time the Seventh Circuit addressed the scope of Section 13(d)’s 
implied cause of action in more than 20 years.9 Section IV explains 
why the Edelson Court incorrectly held that the plaintiff did not have 
standing to assert a private right of action under section 13(d). Section 
V of this Note explains why the disclosure requirements set forth in 
Section 13(d) apply beyond the context of a tender offer. Finally, this 
article cautions that Edelson may have the adverse affect of 
discouraging corporate directors from questioning the propriety and 
legality of board decisions in conflict with the very purpose of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 et seq. Furthermore, Edelson 
creates a conflict between circuits.     
 
                                                 
8 See Ind. Nat’l Corp., 712 F.2d at 1183 (From its inception, Section 13(d) has 
impliedly had a private cause of action similar to that of Section 14(a), as that 
Section provided the model upon which Section 13(d) was created).  
9 The Edelson holding directly contradicts that of the Indiana National. 
3
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I. BACKGROUND ON THE WILLIAMS ACT AND SECTION 13(D)’S 
PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION 
 
 Reacting to the increased use of cash tender offers to achieve 
corporate takeovers, Congress passed the Williams Act in 1968.10 The 
impetus behind the Act, as stated by its sponsor Senator Williams,11 
was to “close a significant gap in investor protection under the Federal 
securities laws by requiring the disclosure of pertinent information to 
stockholders when persons seek to obtain control of a corporation by a 
cash tender offer or through open market or privately negotiated 
purchases of securities.”12 Prior to the adoption of the Williams Act, 
tender offers and third-party acquisitions of substantial amounts of 
stock, such that a potential for control was created, were not subject to 
substantive registration and disclosure requirements.13   
 In particular, Section 13(d) required any person who acquired 
more than 5% of a class of securities of a corporation to send to the 
issuer and file with the SEC a statement (Schedule 13D or 13G) 
disclosing, among other things, the identities of all persons on whose 
behalf the purchases had been made, the number of shares acquired, 
the source and amount of funds used in making the purchase, and the 
purpose of the purchases in relation to the acquisition of control.14 
Disclosure is of paramount importance, as it enables investors to 
assess the potential for changes in corporate control and adequately 
evaluate a company’s worth.15 Further, disclosure provides for added 
investor protection by minimizing the asymmetrical access to 
                                                 
10 Piper v. Chris-Craft Ind. Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977).   
11 Harrison A. Williams Jr. was a Democrat who represented New Jersey in the 
United States Senate from 1959-1982. See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harrison_A._Williams.   
12 113 Cong. Rec. 854 (1967); See also H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2811, 2814.   
13 Ind. Nat’l Corp. v. Rich, 712 F.2d 1180, 1183 (7th Cir. 1983).  
14 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)).   
15 GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 719-720 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 
406 U.S. 910 (1972). 
4
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information between normal investors and corporate insiders, which 
goes to the essence of the federal securities laws.    
 From the time of its enactment in 1968, Section 13(d) was 
understood by courts and legislators to impliedly contain a private 
right of action.16 Indeed, the Williams Act was patterned upon the 
protections already available in the proxy rules, Sections 14(a) of the 
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n, which courts had previously found to 
contain such an implied right.17 Then, in 1971, the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit explicitly held that a private right of action for 
issuer corporations must be implied under Section 13(d).18 Shortly 
thereafter, the Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to the Second 
Circuit’s ruling.19 Despite several amendments to the Williams Act, 
Congress left the remedy intact.20      
 
II. INDIANA NATIONAL CORP. V. RICH: AND THE COURT SAID, LET 
THERE BE SECTION 13(D) 
 
 In 1983, the Seventh Circuit addressed, for the first time, the 
scope of the implied private remedy under Section 13(d).21 
Specifically, the issue addressed in Indiana National Corp. v. Rich was 
whether an implied private right of action existed for an issuer 
corporation to seek injunctive relief under Section 13(d) of the 
                                                 
16 Ind. Nat’l Corp. 712 F.2d at 1183; see also Statement by former SEC 
Chairman Manual F. Cohen during Hearing on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. On 
Securities of the Senate Comm. On Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 
(1967) (“The procedures provided by the bill in the case of contested tender offers 
are analogous to those now followed when contending factions solicit proxies under 
the Commission’s proxy rules”). 
17 Ind. Nat’l Corp. 712 F.2d at 1183. 
18 See GAF Corp., 453 F.2d at 719-720 (2d Cir. 1971). 
19 Ind. Nat’l Corp. 712 F.2d at 1184; see Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 
U.S. 49, 59 n.9 (1975) (The Supreme Court assumed, without directly confronting 
the issue, that 13(d) provided for a private right of action to issuer corporations with 
respect to injunctive relief).   
20 Ind. Nat’l Corp. 712 F.2d at 1184; see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 381-82 (1982). 
21 Ind. Nat’l Corp. 712 F.2d at 1181. 
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Securities Exchange Act (“Exchange Act”) against a group of 
investors who had aggregated more than 5% of Indiana National 
Corporation’s stock.22  
 In that case, the plaintiff, Indiana National Corporation 
(“Indiana National”), was a bank holding company engaged 
principally in the banking business through its wholly owned 
subsidiary, Indiana National Bank.23 Indiana National’s stock was 
traded in the over-the-counter market, and was registered pursuant to 
Section 12 of the Exchange Act.24 The defendants were a group of 
investors who, during 1981 and 1982, acquired more than 5% of 
Indiana National’s stock.25 In accordance with Section 13(d), they 
filed a Schedule 13D in September of 1981, and subsequently 
amended it six times between then and August, 1982.26 
 In July, 1982, Indiana National filed a complaint alleging that 
the defendants’ Schedule 13D contained materially false and 
misleading information, in that it failed to disclose, among other 
things, the defendants’ intention to acquire control of Indiana 
National.27 The plaintiff sought a court order compelling defendants to 
file an amended Schedule 13D stating their intention to acquire control 
of Indiana National, as well as enjoining defendants from acquiring 
more shares of Indiana National and compelling them to divest 
themselves of a portion of the shares already held.28 In response, the 
defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that Indiana National, as 
the issuer, had no standing to assert a claim under Section 13(d); the 
district court granted its motions on this ground.29 On appeal, the 
Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s holding, stating 
                                                 
22 Id.  




27 Id. at 1182.   
28 Id.   
29 Id. 
6
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unequivocally that “an implied right of action exists in favor of an 
issuer under Section 13(d).”30 
 In so holding, the court provided an extensive analysis of 
Section 13(d) standing as it pertains to issuer corporations via 
incumbent management. While conceding that Section 13(d)’s purpose 
was the protection of shareholders and not the protection of incumbent 
management or deterrence of takeover bids, the Indiana National 
Corp. Court found that it is through incumbent management that 
shareholders are protected, rendering the distinction between 
incumbent management and shareholders nominal.31 “In this sense,” 
stated the court, “the corporation’s standing to sue is 
representational.”32 It continued, the manner in which shareholder 
protection is provided by Section 13(d) “is by generating a ‘fair fight’ 
between incumbent management and the persons believed to be 
seeking to acquire control in order that the shareholders may make an 
intelligent decision between them when called upon to do so.”33 
 Thus, incumbent management plays a vitally important role 
in protecting shareholder interests and monitoring the observance of 
Federal securities laws. Shareholders, by themselves, generally lack 
the capacity and knowledge to ensure that Section 13(d) is enforced 
and that a “fair fight” is provided.34 In this respect, the issuer 
corporation via incumbent management, acts on the shareholders’ 
behalf in bringing a suit for injunctive relief until an accurate Schedule 
13D is filed.35 That is not to say that incumbent management 
represents the interests of the shareholders “in relation to who 
ultimately wins any potential struggle for control, but only insofar as 
corporate management acts to ensure the dissemination of accurate 
information about the identity, background and purpose of the persons 
                                                 
30 Id.   
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possibly seeking control of the corporation.”36 As such, a corporation’s 
standing to sue under Section 13(d) is representational and should be 
afforded to (incumbent) management in those instances where both the 
management and shareholders are interested, “realistically” or 
“theoretically,” in preventing injury to any corporate interest resulting 
from a takeover by persons who are either incompetent or intent upon 
plundering the corporate assets.37 
 
III. EDELSON V. CH’IEN: WHAT THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT GIVETH, THE 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT TAKETH AWAY 
 
 More than twenty years after Indiana National, the Seventh 
Circuit once again addressed the scope of the implied private right of 
action under Section 13(d).38 Specifically, the court in Edelson v. 
Ch’ien addressed whether the failure to disclose an intent to affect 
change in corporate control in a Schedule 13G disclosure provided a 
sufficient basis for the plaintiff to state a cause of action under Section 
13(d).39  
 In this case, the plaintiff, Harry Edelson (“Mr. Edelson”), was 
a director and shareholder of defendant Chinadotcom, the issuer, from 
1999 until 2003.40 Individually, the defendants included Peter Yip Hak 
Yung (“Mr. Yip”), CEO of Chinadotcom and shareholder, Raymond 
K.F. Ch’ien (“Mr. Ch’ien”), Executive Chairman of Chinadotcom’s 
board and shareholder, and Chinadotcom.41 
 In early January of 2003, both Mr. Edelson and another 
outside director openly disagreed with Mr. Yip and Mr. Ch’ien 
                                                 
36 Id. (emphasis in the original). 
37 Id. 
38 Edelson v. Ch’ien, 405 F.3d 620, 626 (7th Cir. 2005). 
39 Id.   
40 Id. at 622. (Chinadotcom was a Cayman Island company, headquartered in 
Hong Kong whose stock traded on the NASDAQ exchange during all relevant times 
leading to this dispute).   
41 Id. (Through a family corporation Mr. Yip beneficially owned almost 16.5 
million shares in Chinadotcom, approximately 19% of the outstanding shares of the 
company).  
8
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concerning various corporate governance issues.42 In particular, they 
took issue with the company-sponsored stock buy-back program, 
which they believed to be ethically improper and possibly illegal.43 
Mr. Edelson questioned both Mr. Yip’s and Mr. Ch’ien’s motives in 
backing the program, as they stood to reap huge gains from the buy-
back.44 By way of example, Mr. Yip had purchased 4.3 million shares 
of Chinadotcom stock in a private transaction on January 14, 2003, at 
a price of $2.50 per share.45 The stock buy-back program – that Mr. 
Yip and Mr. Ch’ien so rigorously backed – called for the re-purchase 
of that stock at $3.75 per share.46 
 Prior to Mr. Yip’s January 14 purchase, he filed a disclosure 
pursuant to Section 13(d), as he was the beneficial owner of more than 
5% of the issued and outstanding shares of Chinadotcom stock.47 
However, Mr. Yip did not file a Schedule 13D; instead, he filed a 
Schedule 13G.48 By rule, a shareholder may file a Schedule 13G, a 
less-onerous disclosure form allowed when the individual submitting 
the filing “[h]as not acquired the securities with any purpose, or with 
the effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer.”49 In Mr. 
Yip’s 13G disclosure he certified that (1) the securities he purchased 
were neither acquired nor held “for the purpose of, or with the effect 
of changing or influencing control of the issuer of the securities,” and 
(2) that the securities were neither acquired nor held “in connection 
with or as a participant in any transaction having that purpose or 
effect.”50 




45 Id.; Edelson Complaint, 2004 WL 2174010 at ¶¶ 17-23 (N.D. Ill., May 17, 
2004); Edelson Amended Complaint, 2004 WL 2173998 at ¶¶ 18-25 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 
5, 2005).   
46 Edelson, 405 F.3d at 622. 
47 Id. at 623. 
48 Id.   
49 Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(c)(1). 
50 Edelson, 405 F.3d at 623. 
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 Meanwhile, Mr. Edelson’s dispute with Mr. Yip and Mr. 
Ch’ien continued to escalate through the March 18, 2003 Board 
meeting.51 On April 16, 2003, Mr. Edelson sent an e-mail 
correspondence to Mr. Ch’ien alleging that the independent directors 
on Chinadotcom’s Board were being “bull-dozed” in violation of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, with the result that good corporate governance 
was being disregarded.52 Also during this same time frame, the Board 
was in the process of nominating a new slate of directors.53 All three 
directors who served on the audit committee – Mr. Edelson, Mr. 
Beese, the other dissenting director, and Thomas Britt – had terms set 
to expire after the annual shareholder meeting.54 The annual meeting 
notice sent to all Chinadotcom stockholders recommended the re-
election of all three members, whose nominations were subsequently 
unopposed and uncontested.55 Neither Mr. Yip nor Mr. Ch’ien asserted 
any overt objection whatsoever to Mr. Edelson’s re-elections, and both 
purported to concur in the Board’s recommendation that Mr. Edelson 
and the other candidates be elected.56 
 However, on June 17, 2003, at the Chinadotcom Annual 
Meeting, Mr. Edelson was defeated in an election in which only 48% 
of the shares were voted.57 Of the votes cast, 18,766,947 shares were 
voted in favor of Mr. Edelson’s re-election, 28,264,956 were voted 
against Mr. Edelson’s re-election, and 800 abstained.58 All 16,577,905 
shares beneficially owned by Mr. Yip were voted against Mr. Edelson, 
constituting more than two-thirds of the votes cast against him.59 
Moreover, Mr. Yip did not amend his previously filed Schedule 13G 
                                                 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 623-24. 
53 Id. at 623. 
54 Id.   
55 Id. 
56 Id. (Mr. Edelson’s complaint alleged that Mr. Yip and Mr. Ch’ien concealed 
their opposition to his re-election as part of a scheme to vote him off of the Board).   
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id.   
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prior to voting all of his shares against Mr. Edelson,60 leading the 
Chinadotcom shareholders to believe that the election at the 2003 
Annual Meeting would be evenhanded.   
 In October of 2003, Mr. Edelson filed suit against 
Chinadotcom, alleging, among other things, violations of Section 
13(d), and sought an order declaring the June 2003 election null and 
void, and ordering a new election.61 The gravamen of Mr. Edelson’s 
complaint was that Mr. Yip violated Section 13(d) by not disclosing 
his plan to influence the control of Chinadotcom’s existing board.62 
Specifically, Mr. Edelson contended that Mr. Yip’s Schedule 13G, filed 
after his January purchase of 4.3 million shares, certified that the 
shares would not be held for the purpose of or with the effect of 
changing or influencing control of the issuer.63 Mr. Edelson argued 
further that once Mr. Yip decided to vote against him, as well as the 
other dissenting outside director, Mr. Yip could no longer make such a 
certification and was thereby required to file a Schedule 13D or amend 
his Schedule 13G, which he did not do.64  Mr. Yip argued that the fact 
that a shareholder intends to vote shares in favor or against a director 
does not mean that the shareholder has “the purpose or effect of 
changing or influencing the control of the issuer of the securities.”65 
 The district court denied Mr. Edelson’s request for injunctive 
relief and dismissed his claim finding that he lacked standing to bring 
a Section 13(d) action. The court reasoned that Congress did not 
intend Section 13(d) to serve as a mechanism for “ex-directors to settle 
old feuds.”66 In support of this argument, the district court 
acknowledged that Indiana National authorized a private right of 
action under Section 13(d), but relied on two district court decisions – 
one from Louisiana and the other from Maryland – holding that former 
                                                 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id.   
63 Id. at 623. 
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directors of a corporation could not bring suit under Section 13(d).67 
“If there is a spectrum of shareholder sophistication,” said the court, 
“with unsuspecting investors on one end, and well-informed members 
of management who can adequately protect their own interests on the 
other, then Edelson certainly lies closer to management than to the 
common shareholder.”68 Thus, the court concluded that Mr. Edelson, 
as a director, was neither the appropriate representative of his interest 
as a shareholder nor those of other shareholders.69     
 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, but on grounds other 
than those relied upon by the district court.70 Rather than focusing on 
Mr. Edelson’s status as an ex-director, the Seventh Circuit reasoned 
that he lacked any viable Section 13(d) claim in his capacity as a 
Chinadotcom shareholder.71 Specifically, the court held that Mr. Yip’s 
failure to disclose his intent under the circumstances of this case did 
not provide Mr. Edelson, as a shareholder, with a sufficient basis to 
state a cause of action.72 The court further concluded that Congress 
intended to recognize a private cause of action under Section 13(d) 
only in the context of a tender offer or other contest for control; 
therefore, Mr. Yip’s action in voting against Mr. Edelson fell outside of 
the scope of Section 13(d).73 In support of its holding, the court 
proffered a characterization oft-repeated by courts that have addressed 
Section 13(d) claims: 
 
Our review of the legislative history convinces us that 
the overriding purpose of Congress was to protect the 
individual investor when substantial shareholders or 
                                                 
67 Id. at 624-25 (citing Mates v. N. American Vaccine, Inc., 53 F.Supp.2d 814 
(D. Md. 1999)); Nowling v. Aero Serv. Int’l, Inc., 752 F.Supp. 1304 (E.D. La. 
1990), notwithstanding plain language in Ind. Nat’l leading to the opposite 
conclusion. 





73 Id.   
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management undertake to acquire shares in a 
corporation for the purpose of solidifying their own 
position in a contest over how or by whom the 
operation should be managed.74              
 
 Section 13(d), in the court’s own words, “was designed to 
provide information to the investor when faced with a tender offer or 
other accumulation or aggregation of stock that could affect corporate 
control.”75 In sum, despite Mr. Yip’s accumulation of 19% of 
Chinadotcom’s stock and questionable disclosure, Mr. Edelson’s status 
as a shareholder and director charged with protecting common 
shareholders, Seventh Circuit case law favoring Mr. Edelson, and the 
complete absence of language in Section 13(d) limiting its scope to 
tender offers, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
judgment against Mr. Edelson.  
 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT’S STANDING ANALYSIS 
 
 The Seventh Circuit should have reversed the district court’s 
finding that Mr. Edelson did not have standing to assert a private right 
of action under Section 13(d) for three reasons. First, by focusing on 
Mr. Edelson’s position as a former board member, as opposed to his 
status as owner of several hundred thousand Chinadotcom shares, the 
district court concluded that he was not within the class of people that 
Section 13(d) was enacted to protect.76 Second, while claiming to 
embrace the Indiana National reasoning, the district court came to a 
conclusion directly contrary to its primary contention regarding 
Section 13(d) standing.77 Finally, not only did the court of appeals 
                                                 
74 Id. at 631; see, e.g., Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970). 
75 Edelson, 405 F.3d at 631 (emphasis added). 
76 See id. at 625. (“If there is a spectrum of shareholder sophistication . . . 
Edelson certainly lies closer to management than to the common shareholder”). 
77 See Ind. Nat’l Corp. v. Rich, 712 F.2d 1180, 1185 (7th Cir. 1983) (A 
corporation’s standing to sue under Section 13(d) is representational and should be 
afforded to (incumbent) management in those instances where both the management 
and shareholders are interested, “realistically” or “theoretically,” in preventing injury 
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uphold the district court’s ruling for which extra-district (district court) 
case law was relied upon despite the existence of Seventh Circuit 
authority, the cases relied upon were inapposite. In doing so, the court 
created a potential conflict among the circuits as the Second Circuit 
reached an inapposite result in GAF Corp. v. Milstein.78 Each of these 
points is further elucidated below. 
 
A. Mr. Edelson was a Shareholder 
 
 Both Mr. Edelson and the Chinadotcom defendants agreed 
that the purpose of Section 13(d) was to protect shareholders, and 
further, that it provided a private right of action for injunctive relief in 
favor of shareholders.79 Courts have uniformly found a private right of 
action on behalf of shareholders under Section 13(d) for claims 
involving injunctive relief.80 Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that 
the Williams Act’s central thrust was to provide shareholders with 
more extensive protection under the Federal securities laws.81 The 
theme of investor protection was emphasized by Senator Williams on 
the day the Senate passed the Williams Act: 
 
                                                                                                                   
to any corporate interest resulting from a takeover by persons who are either 
incompetent or intent upon plundering the corporate assets). 
78 The district court modified the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals holding in 
Ind. Nat’l Corp. by citing to Mates v. N. American Vaccine, Inc. and Nowling v. 
Aero Serv. Int’l, Inc., both extra-district rulings.  Further, both cases are inapposite.  
See Amicus Brief by the Securities and Exchange Commission in Support of 
Plaintiff (Mr. Edelson), 2004 WL 3760475, at *25-26 (7th Cir. Dec. 15, 2004).   
79 See Edelson, 405 F.3d at 631.   
80 See Myers v. American Leisure Time Enters., Inc., 402 F.Supp. 213, 214 
(D.C.N.Y. 1975); Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F.Supp. 44, 50 (D.N.J. 1974); 
Jacobs v. Pabst Brewing Co., 549 F.Supp. 1050, 1059-63 (D. Del. 1982)(The Jacobs 
Court concluded that an implied private right of action for injunctive relief exists 
under Section 13(d) for shareholders of a target corporation); See also Diceon Elecs., 
Inc. v. Calvary Partners, L.P., 772 F.Supp. 859, 863 (D. Del. 1991) (affirming the 
Jacobs Court finding). 
81 See Piper v. Chris-Craft Ind. Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1977); see also 
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975). 
14
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[The Federal securities laws] provide protections for 
millions of American investors by requiring full 
disclosure of information in connection with the public 
offering and trading of securities.  These laws have 
worked well in providing the public with adequate 
information on which to base intelligent investment 
decisions.  There are, however, some areas still 
remaining where the full disclosure is necessary for 
investor protection but not required by present law.  
One such area is the purchase by direct acquisition or 
by tender offers of substantial blocks of securities of 
publicly held companies.  [The Williams Act] provides 
for investor protection in these areas.82 
 
 Mr. Edelson was the investor in, and shareholder of, several 
hundred thousand Chinadotcom shares.83 Despite his status as a 
shareholder, the district court found that Mr. Edelson was not entitled 
to seek injunctive relief under Section 13(d).84 The court of appeals 
accepted, out of hand, the district court’s reasoning that, because a 
majority of the injuries alleged by Mr. Edelson concerned his position 
as a member of the board as opposed to his position as a shareholder, 
he was not entitled to protection as a shareholder under Section 
13(d).85 This reasoning, however, is contradictory. By admitting that 
even one of Mr. Edelson’s claims arose by virtue of his status as a 
shareholder, the court is then forced to acknowledge that he has those 
rights afforded all other shareholders, to wit, standing to sue under 
Section 13(d). Moreover, Mr. Edelson alleged that he, as a shareholder, 
was not informed by Mr. Yip and Mr. Ch’ien about their plans to 
change the composition of the Board.86 If taken as true, there is no 
                                                 
82 Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation 2165 (3d ed. 1990), 
quoting 113 Cong. Rec. 24664.  
83 See Edelson, 405 F.3d at 622.  
84 Id. at 625.   
85 Id. at 623, 625.   
86 Id. at 625. 
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question that Mr. Yip and Mr. Ch’ien would have been required to 
disclose their intent pursuant to Section 13(d). The extension of 
management’s control over a company to the exclusion of dissenting 
parties is just the type of event that Section 13(d)’s disclosure 
requirement was intended to reveal to shareholders.87 In addition, 
Schedule 13D itself includes the requirement that a filer must disclose 
any plan or intent to change the composition of corporate boards.88 
Yet, the court chose not to address any of these arguments.89 
 Despite ultimately deciding against Mr. Edelson by reasoning 
that Section 13(d)’s implied cause of action applies only in the context 
of a tender offer or other contest for control,90 the court’s decision 
would presumably have been different if another shareholder brought 
the action. The Edelson Court approvingly cited to various language in 
the district court’s holding admonishing Mr. Edelson for bringing suit. 
“Congress did not intend Section 13(d) to be a mechanism for ex-
directors to settle old feuds.”91 “This Court declines” to grant a “cause 
of action under Section 13(d) for former directors whom management 
has ousted . . . . Congress did not intend former directors to wield 
Section 13(d) on their own behalf.”92 This argument is not without 
merit. However, the fact remains that Mr. Edelson was a shareholder 
despite his role as director. All shareholders are afforded rights under 
the federal securities laws, and justice is not served by vitiating those 
rights for shareholders who also happen to be corporate directors and 
officers of the company in which they own shares.   
 While the use of Section 13(d) as a mechanism for ex-
directors to “settle old feuds” may be a nuisance to the court, it is 
                                                 
87 See Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97,109 (7th Cir. 1970); see also 
Amicus Brief by the Securities and Exchange Commission in Support of Plaintiff 
(Mr. Edelson), 2004 WL 3760475, at *22 (7th Cir. Dec.15, 2004). 
88 See Schedule 13D, Item 4.   
89 See Edelson, 405 F.3d at 625. (The court refused to address the issue of 
whether Mr. Edelson should be afforded those rights guaranteed general 
shareholders by Section 13(d)). 
90 Id. at 634. 
91 Id. at 624.   
92 Id. at 625.   
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worth the cost. Corporate insiders are the gate-keepers for common 
shareholders and are in the best position to identify and bring to light 
corporate foul play. Common shareholders are often too far removed 
from the inner workings of the company they own to effectively 
prevent potential violations of federal securities laws.93 As such, ex-
director-shareholders may actually be the best plaintiffs in a Section 
13(d) suit. They are privy to the inner workings of the company yet 
still share the concerns of all other common shareholders – such as, 
the prudent and impartial management of the company for the benefit 
of all shareholders, not just the few in control. To preclude corporate 
insiders, and specifically ex-directors, from bringing suit under 
Section 13(d) because of their dual status as management and 
shareholder would constitute a setback in our federal securities law 
jurisprudence. Indeed, as stated by Justice Learned Hand, “it is one of 
the surest indexes of mature and developed jurisprudence . . . to 
remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to 
accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the 
surest guide to their meaning.”94 To read director-shareholders out of 
Section 13(d)’s implied private right of action would run directly 
contrary to this notion.                   
 The court further accepted the Chinadotcom defendants’ 
argument that if Mr. Edelson was correct, Rule 13d-1(e)(1),95 “taken to 
                                                 
93GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 721 (2d Cir. 1971).  
94 Id. at 716 (citing Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945)).    
95 Rule 13d-1(e)(1):  
Notwithstanding paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section and Rule 
13d-2(b), a person that has reported that it is the beneficial owner 
of more than five percent of a class of equity securities in a 
statement on Schedule 13G pursuant to paragraph (b) or (c) of this 
section, or is required to report the acquisition but has not yet filed 
the schedule, shall immediately become subject to Rule 13d-1(a) 
and Rule 13d-2(a) and shall file a statement on Schedule 13D 
within 10 days if, and shall remain subject to those requirements 
for so long as, the person:  
(1)Has acquired or holds the securities with a purpose or effect of 
changing or influencing control of the issuer, or in connection with 
17
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its logical conclusion, would mean that no Schedule 13G filer would 
ever be able to vote its securities in a board election . . . without first 
filing a Schedule 13D because the mere voting of its securities is . . . 
equivalent to changing or influencing control of the issuer.”96 This 
argument is misplaced. Section 13(d), as stated above, was intended to 
protect shareholders by requiring honest disclosure of one’s intent in 
accumulating large amounts of stock in a publicly held corporations. 
The argument was not that Mr. Yip would have been precluded from 
voting his shares without filing a Schedule 13D regardless of the 
manner in which he chose to vote.97 Instead, Mr. Edelson argued that 
once Mr. Yip, as the beneficial owner of a significant block of 
Chinadotcom shares, decided to use the voting power associated with 
that block in an effort to change the composition of Chinadotcom’s 
Board, and thereby alter control over Chinadotcom, it was incumbent 
on him to disclose his intentions to do so.98 In the absence of such a 
disclosure, the 2003 Chinadotcom annual meeting seemed, to all 
outward appearances, to be a mere corporate formality, at which the 
composition of the company’s Board would remain unchanged and the 
stewardship of the company would be in the hands of the same people 
who had been guiding its affairs.  
 Thus, if Mr. Yip had disclosed his opposition to Mr. Edelson, 
presumably more than 48% of the voting shares would have been 
voted at the meeting, and likely would have been in favor of Mr. 
Edelson’s re-instatement, as his election was uncontested.99 In short, 
had Mr. Yip filed an honest disclosure, more shareholders would have 
voted, and Mr. Yip would have needed more than his 19% ownership 
in Chinadotcom to hand Mr. Edelson his defeat. In the court’s own 
words, Section 13(d) “was designed to provide information to the 
                                                                                                                   
or as a participant in any transaction having that purpose or effect, 
including any transaction subject to Rule 13d-3(b); and  
(2) Is at that time the beneficial owner of more than five percent of 
a class of equity securities described in Rule 13d-1(i). 
96 See Edelson, 405 F.3d at 624. 
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investor when faced with a tender offer or other accumulation or 
aggregation of stock that could affect corporate control.”100 Ironically, 
the approach actually taken by the court led to the opposite conclusion. 
 Moreover, neither Indiana National Corp. nor any of the 
other circuit decisions recognizing a private right of action under 
Section 13(d) had ever before imposed a requirement that private 
actions under Section 13(d) were limited to situations involving tender 
offers or other accumulations of stock for the purpose of affecting 
corporate control.  Instead, prior to the Edelson decision, the Seventh 
Circuit and other federal appellate courts had uniformly held that an 
issuer itself may sue on behalf of its shareholders when attempting to 
obtain injunctive relief compelling the disclosures that are required 
under Section 13(d).101  
 
B. Indiana National Provided a Basis for Standing 
 
 Had the court followed its own precedent set in Indiana 
National Corp., Mr. Edelson would have easily met the standing 
requirement, as his standing would have been akin to that of an issuer 
bringing suit on behalf of all shareholders.102 While the Indiana 
National Court makes clear that Section 13(d) was enacted solely for 
the protection of shareholders and was not intended to protect 
incumbent management or discourage takeover bids, it goes on to 
explain that incumbent management is often the vehicle by which 
shareholders’ rights are protected.103 
 
The manner in which [Section 13(d)] protection is to be 
provided . . . is by generating a “fair fight” between the 
incumbent management and the persons believed to be 
                                                 
100 Id. at 632. 
101 See Ind. Nat’l Corp. v. Rich, 712 F.2d 1180, 1185-86 (7th Cir. 1983); 
accord Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1158 (9th Cir. 1992); 
Gearhart Ind. Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 714-15 (5th Cir. 1984); Dan 
River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216, 1224 (4th Cir. 1980). 
102 See Ind. Nat’l Corp., 712 F.2d at 1185. 
103 Id. at 1185-86.   
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seeking control in order that the shareholders may make 
an intelligent decision between them when called upon 
to do so. Yet the shareholders have neither the 
knowledge nor the capacity to ensure that Section 13(d) 
is enforced and a “fair fight” thus provided. In this 
respect, and for this limited purpose . . . the issuer 
corporation acts on the shareholders’ behalf in 
bringing a suit for injunctive relief until an accurate 
Schedule 13D is filed. Without question, the incumbent 
management does not represent the shareholders with 
respect to who ultimately wins any potential struggle 
for control but only insofar as corporate management 
acts to ensure the dissemination of accurate 
information about the identity, background and 
purpose of the persons possibly seeking control of the 
corporation. In this sense, the corporation’s standing to 
sue under Section 13(d) is representational. Of course, 
presumably there are many circumstances where both 
the management and the shareholders are interested 
sometimes quite realistically and sometimes only 
theoretically, in preventing the injury to the corporate 
interest which would result from a takeover by persons 
who are either incompetent or intent upon plundering 
the corporate assets.104             
 
 The analysis, based on the Indiana National Court’s 
reasoning is straightforward. The Chinadotcom shareholders had 
neither the knowledge nor the capacity to ensure Mr. Yip’s and Mr. 
Ch’ien’s compliance with Section 13(d), as they were not privy to the 
conflict between the Mr. Edelson and the Chinadotcom defendants. 
Nor were the shareholders privy to the possible corporate governance 
issues arising from Mr. Yip’s and Mr. Ch’ien’s behavior – that is, the 
aggregation of power between two board members giving them the 
ability to plunder corporate assets and to make decisions for their sole 
                                                 
104 Id. at 1185. 
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benefit. Mr. Edelson, therefore, in attempting to invalidate the election 
and require Mr. Yip to file an accurate Schedule 13D was functioning 
as the issuer bringing suit on behalf of the shareholders. In short, it 
was through Mr. Edelson that a “fair fight” was to ensue.105 
Representative standing is appropriate where management and 
shareholders’ interests are either theoretically or realistically 
aligned.106 Accordingly, Mr. Edelson should have been granted 
standing.     
 
C. Second Circuit Authority Supported Standing 
   
 Finally, the conclusion that Mr. Edelson should have had 
standing in this case is further supported by the Second Circuit’s 
decision in GAF Corp. v. Milstein.107 The court stated:  
 
The history and language of Section 13(d) make it clear 
that the statute was primarily concerned with disclosure 
of potential changes in control resulting from new 
aggregations of stockholdings and was not intended to 
be restricted to only individual stockholders who made 
                                                 
105 The fact that Mr. Edelson was a director as opposed to a manager is also 
insignificant, as the Edelson Court itself characterizes his position as akin to a “well-
informed member[] of management.”  See Edelson, 405 F.3d at 625.  
106 Ind. Nat’l Corp., 712 F.2d at 1186. 
107 Notably, at least four other circuits have explicitly followed the holding in 
GAF Corp. recognizing that issuers have a cause of action for injunctive relief.  See 
Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1158 (9th Cir. 1992); Gearhart Ind., 
Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 714 (5th Cir. 1984); Ind. Nat’l Corp., 712 
F.2d at 1184; Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216, 1224 (4th Cir. 1980); 
see also CNW Corp. v. Japonica Partners, 874 F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 1989)(implicitly 
assuming the existence of a cause of action for injunctive relief without discussion); 
Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1979)(same); 
Gen. Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90, 94 n. 5 (1st Cir. 1977)(explicitly 
assuming the existence of such a cause of action without deciding); but see Liberty 
Nat’l Ins. Holding Co. v. Charter Co., 734 F.2d 545, 555-59 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that issuers have no cause of action for injunctive relief under Section 
13(d)).   
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future purchases and whose actions were, therefore, 
more apparent. . ..  It hardly can be questioned that a 
group holding sufficient shares can effect a takeover 
without purchasing a single additional share of stock.108   
 
 Specifically, the court in GAF Corp. v. Milstein addressed 
whether the plaintiff-corporation had standing under Section 13(d) to 
seek an injunction against allegedly false and misleading filings by a 
group of shareholders.109 The court also addressed the meaning of the 
term “acquire” as used in Section 13(d) and whether the change in 
beneficial interest of a number of shares constituted an “acquisition” 
despite the fact that the defendants did not actually acquire additional 
shares.110  
 The defendants were shareholders who collectively owned 
more than 10% of the shares in plaintiff GAF Corporation, and who 
allegedly conspired to affect change in the company’s management 
without disclosing their intent pursuant to Section 13(d).111 The court 
held that, for purposes of Section 13(d), the conspiracy equated to an 
“acquisition” of shares by those individuals involved in the conspiracy, 
despite the fact that no additional shares were purchased.112 A 
shareholder’s intent to shift the “loci of corporate power and 
influence” is an acquisition for purposes of Section 13(d).113 Such 
acquisitions are “hardly dependent on an actual transfer of legal title to 
shares.”114 Section 13(d) is “primarily concerned with disclosure of 
potential changes in control” and was not meant to be restricted to 
                                                 
108 GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 718 (2d Cir. 1971). 
109 Id. at 720. 
110 Id. at 715. 
111 Id. at 713. 
112 Id. at 717-18. 
113 Id. at 718. 
114 Id. (“The alleged conspiracy on the part of the [plaintiffs] is one clearly 
intended to be encompassed within the reach of Section 13(d)”). 
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transparent attempts by shareholders to assert control over a 
company.115   
 In the event that a shareholder files a false and misleading 
Section 13(d) filing, the GAF Court was equally clear on who has 
standing to sue. Whether it be the SEC116 issuer, management, or 
shareholder, the person in the “best position to enforce Section 13(d)” 
should have standing to sue under the statute.117 Indeed the issuer, or a 
representative of the issuer such as Mr. Edelson, “in the course of 
constantly monitoring transactions in its stock” will regularly be in the 
best position to know when there has been a failure to file or if a filing 
is false and misleading.118 “Moreover, the issuer [via management] has 
not only resources, but the self-interest so vital to maintaining an 
injunctive action.”119 While this approach may play upon 
management’s self interest, this danger can be adequately counter-
acted by the court’s careful scrutiny of claims so as to ensure that 
investors’ interests are being protected.120  
 According to GAF Corp., Mr. Edelson’s claim against 
Chinadotcom should have fit squarely within the realm of Section 
13(d) protection. Mr. Yip, as owner of 19% of Chinadotcom’s shares, 
had a duty to disclose that he sought to use those shares to effect 
change in Chinadotcom’s governing body. Had he properly disclosed 
his intent, all of Chinadotcom’s shareholders would have been put on 
notice that a potential change in control would result from the 2003 
election and more shareholders probably would have voted. 
 In response to the query whether Mr. Edelson should have 
had standing to seek injunctive relief it is inadequate to argue simply 
                                                 
115 Id. 
116 The SEC has brought suit against shareholders for violating Section 13(d).  
See SEC v. Amster & Co., 762 F.Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); SEC v. Savoy Indus., 
Inc., 587 F.2d 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1978); SEC v. First City Financial Corp., Ltd., 890 
F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1989).   
117 GAF Corp., 453 F.2d at 719.   
118 Id. at 719-21.   
119 Id. at 719.   
120 Id. at 719-20.   
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that the SEC can proceed under penal provisions.121 The issuer, 
through its officers and directors, are the only parties which can 
“promptly and effectively police Schedule 13D filings, for it is fair to 
assume that it carefully scrutinizes changes in its stock-ownership – 
particularly of the sort which can initiate control.”122 Even if the SEC 
had the requisite manpower to delve into the details of each filing 
pursuant to Section 13(d), it does not have the issuer’s day-to-day 
familiarity with the facts which would enable it to accurately appraise 
the statements in such disclosures.123 Certainly, “[a]n already 
overburdened Commission staff, taxed with reviewing increased 
filings under the securities acts, [will] welcome a ‘necessary 
supplement’ to its action.”124 
 Nor is it realistic to expect shareholders to deter persons from 
filing inaccurate statements by resort to the antifraud provisions.125 
“Stockholders are generally unaware of the necessary background 
information to judge the truth or falsity of the statements.”126 
Moreover, since federal securities laws do not require the filings 
pursuant to Section 13(d) to be disseminated to the shareholders, they 
are not immediately put on notice that new company filings have 
occurred.127 In contrast, officers and directors are given immediate 
notice as filings are required to be disseminated to them under the 
federal securities laws.128  Additionally, “there may be instances where 
no shareholder has purchased or sold shares in reliance on the 
statements. In that event, even if the shareholders had standing there 
would be little incentive to maintain and action” because the 
recoverable damages would amount to a fraction of the cost incurred 
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to bring suit.129 The onus then falls completely on the shoulders of 
officers and directors to ensure compliance with federal securities laws 
and to adequately protect the collective interests of passive 
shareholders.   
 While the advent of EDGAR provides for increased 
shareholder access to filings, it would be unreasonable to require 
passive shareholders to police all executive decisions by themselves 
without the assistance of insiders who have an affirmative duty to such 
shareholders and are privy to information providing context to 
questionable executive decisions. In sum, corporate directors should 
be encouraged to monitor the legality of executive decisions and 
should further be encouraged to bring suit when false and deceptive 
filings are made by executive officers. Doing so provides for the 
complete and adequate protection of shareholders as contemplated by 
the federal securities laws.                              
 
V. CONTEXT IS EVERYTHING: SECTION 13(D)’S PRIVATE RIGHT OF 
ACTION WAS MEANT TO APPLY BROADLY  
 
 Ultimately, the death knell in Mr. Edelson’s case was the 
court’s unprecedented holding that section 13(d) applies only in the 
context of a tender offer or other contest for control.130 The plain 
language and legislative history of Section 13(d) provide for a much 
broader range of cases. Further, the rules adopted by the SEC pursuant 
to Section 13(d) extend well beyond the tender offer context.131 
 To determine the scope of Section 13(d), we must first look to 
the statute’s plain language.132 Section 13(d) broadly states that “[a]ny 
person [who, after acquiring a class of securities registered under 
Section 12 is] directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 
5 per centum of such a class” is required to make certain 
                                                 
129 Id. 
130 Edelson v. Ch’ien, 405 F.3d 620, 634 (7th Cir. 2005).  
131 SEC Amicus Brief, 2004 WL 3760475, at *30.   
132 Edelson, 405 F.2d at 632.  
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disclosures.133 In fact, as the Edelson Court concedes, Congress did 
not use the term “tender offer” anywhere in Section 13(d).134 
Therefore, by simply looking at the plain language of the statute, there 
is no sound basis for concluding that it applies only to a situation 
which it does not even mention.135 The court goes on, however, to look 
at Section 13(d)’s triggering requirements and interprets Congress’ 
intent to restrict it to tender offer’s by focusing on the word 
“acquiring” as used in 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1), which states that 
disclosure is required where an individual “acquir[es] directly or 
indirectly the beneficial ownership” of five percent of any class of 
security.136  
 There are several problems with Seventh Circuit’s approach.  
First, this argument does not address the obvious lack of the term 
“tender offer” in the statute. Second, as discussed above, the GAF 
Court already determined that “aggregation” and “acquisition” are 
synonymous for purposes of Section 13(d).137 In view of the finding in 
GAF, the Edelson Court’s emphasis on the term “acquiring” was 
unsubstantiated. Mr. Yip accumulated (or aggregated) a 19% 
ownership interest in Chinadotcom, which is well beyond the 5% 
threshold set forth in Section 13(d)’s triggering requirements.138 As 
beneficial owner of more than 5% of the stock, Mr. Yip was required 
                                                 
133 See Securities Exchange Act § 13(d); see also SEC Amicus Brief, 2004 WL 
376075, at *27. (“While the increase in cash tender offers was the genesis of the 
Williams Act, [the] assertion that Section 13(d) only applies to tender offers or 
contests for control of the issuer is nonsense.  The Williams Act’s coverage is very 
broad”).  
134 Edelson, 405 F.2d at 632; See also Section 13(d).  
135 See SEC Amicus Brief, 2004 WL 376075, at *29 (“The statute . . . expressly 
requires disclosure even where there is no control-purpose or contest for control.  
The statute requires ‘any person’ who accumulates 5 percent of a class of stock of an 
issuer to make the appropriate filings and include the disclosure required by the 
form”). 
136 Edelson, 405 F.2d at 632.   
137 See GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 718 (2d Cir. 1971) (It should also 
be noted that Congress has not taken any action to vitiate the GAF Court’s analysis, 
which has stood now for 35 years). 
138 See Edelson, 405 F.2d at 622-23.   
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to honestly disclose his intent with regards to the stock so as to inform 
the shareholders and the market of a potential change in control.139 
 Finally, Section 14(d)(1) of the Exchange Act speaks directly, 
and exclusively, to tender offers.140 Notably, that section sets forth the 
specific procedure to be used in the context of tender offers and it 
                                                 
139 See GAF Corp., 453 F.2d at 717 (The goal of section 13(d) “is to alert the 
market place to every large, rapid aggregation or accumulation of securities, 
regardless of the technique employed, which might represent a potential shift in 
corporate control.”); see also Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 
357, 380 (2d Cir. 1980); Gearhart Ind. Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 715 
(5th Cir. 1984); SEC Amicus Brief, 2004 WL 376075, at *29.  
140 Securities Exchange Act § 14(d)(1): 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of 
the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or 
otherwise, to make a tender offer for, or a request or invitation for 
tenders of, any class of any equity security which is registered 
pursuant to Section 12 of this title, or any equity security of an 
insurance company which would have been required to be so 
registered except for the exemption contained in Section 
12(g)(2)(G) of this title, or any equity security issued by a closed-
end investment company registered under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, if, after consummation thereof, such person 
would, directly or indirectly, be the beneficial owner of more than 
5 per centum of such class, unless at the time copies of the offer or 
request or invitation are first published or sent or given to security 
holders such person has filed with the Commission a statement 
containing such of the information specified in Section 13(d) of 
this title, and such additional information as the Commission may 
by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors. All requests or 
invitations for tenders or advertisements making a tender offer or 
requesting or inviting tenders of such a security shall be filed as a 
part of such statement and shall contain such of the information 
contained in such statement as the Commission may by rules and 
regulations prescribe. Copies of any additional material soliciting 
or requesting such tender offers subsequent to the initial 
solicitation or request shall contain such information as the 
Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary 
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors .  
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makes reference to Section 13(d)’s disclosure requirements as the 
method by which disclosure should be made in the tender offer 
context.141 To read Section 13(d) so narrowly as to apply only in the 
context of a tender offer, or other similar contest for control, would be 
to render it a redundancy in the federal securities laws regime, as 
Section 14(d) already covers the field.142 Certainly, the drafters of the 
Williams Act and, specifically, Section 13(d) did not intend for it to be 
a redundancy as they were specifically filling the “gap” remaining in 
securities law regime in existence at the time.143    
 Further evidence of Section 13(d)’s broad scope is found in 
the statute’s legislative history.  Manual Cohen, SEC Chairman in 
1967, informed Congress that the Williams Act was to deal with stock 
acquisitions in three contexts: first, in the context of any acquisition of 
stock by means of a cash tender offer of more than 5% (10% at the 
time of enactment) of any class of stock of a publicly held company; 
second, in the context of other acquisitions, outside of cash tender 
offers, by any person or group of more than 5% of any class of stock 
of a publicly held company; and third, in the context of an issuer’s 
repurchase of its own outstanding shares.144 Congress enacted the 
Williams Act with the understanding that it would require disclosure 
of “the material facts concerning the identity, background, and plans of 
the person or group making a tender offer or acquiring a substantial 
amount of securities.”145 
 With respect to Section 13(d)’s plain language and legislative 
history, there is an absence of support for the contention that it applies 
only to the tender offer context (or in the context of other similar 
                                                 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
144 Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover 
Bids: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Committee on Banking 
and Currency, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 16, 33 (1967); see also SEC Amicus Brief, 2004 
WL 376075, at *27. 
145 S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967); see also SEC Amicus Brief, 
2004 WL 376075, at *28.  
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contests for control). The SEC, in support of Mr. Edelson, put it most 
aptly:  
 
[N]othing in Section 13(d) limits its coverage to rapid 
accumulations.  While this may have been the typical 
scenario with which the section was concerned, it 
requires filing and disclosure, subject to certain 
exceptions not applicable [in Edelson v. Ch’ien], 
whenever and however the 5 percent threshold is 
crossed.  Material changes in the facts set forth in the 
disclosure schedules, such as the acquisition or 
disposition of one percent or more of the subject 
security, must also be reported in the amended filing 
irrespective of whether such changes occur in the 
context of a tender offer or control contest.146 
 
In sum, “[t]he disclosures required of ‘any person’ by section 
13(d) . . . apply regardless of whether a tender offer or any other effort 
to change or influence control is contemplated or pursued.147  The 
Williams Act, and specifically Section 13(d), was enacted to provide 
investors with broad protection.148 “Any judicial impetus to cut back 
on the seeming thrust of the statute must be scrutinized in light of . . . 
the amendment which broadened the impact of Section 13(d) by 
reducing the threshold triggering of the statute from 10% holdings to 
5%.”149 Further, “the statute cannot be faulted” if, “as a by-product, 
management . . . becomes aware of those seeking to seize control of 
the corporation” and, consequently, files suit.150      
                                                 
146 SEC Amicus Brief, 2004 WL 376075, at *29 n.17.  
147 V Loss & Seligman, Securities Regulation 2176; see Chromalloy Am. 
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240, 245 (8th Cir. 1979) (“[A] securities 
purchaser is required to disclose the purpose of the purchase  . . . regardless of 
whether the underlying purpose is to acquire control of the issuer”); see also SEC 
Amicus Brief, 2004 WL 376075, at *28-29.  
148 See Piper v. Chris-Craft Ind. Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1977). 
149 GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 719 n. 19 (2d Cir. 1971).   
150 Id. 
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 The Edelson Court rejected Mr. Edelson’s and the SEC’s final 
argument that the implementing regulations further elucidate the broad 
scope of the statute.151 The court summarily rejected the argument 
without citing to any definitive language in Section 13(d) to support 
the court’s contention that the statute applies only in the context of a 
tender offer.152 Nor did the court provide any substantive legislative 
history to support its contention.153 There is no doubt that the language 
of the statute controls and the rules adopted pursuant thereto can 
provide only moderate interpretive authority.154 However, as argued 
above, the statutory language is very broad and the legislative history 
further supports a broad reading of it. The implementing regulations 
simply provide a final means of interpreting the scope of the statute. 
According to the Rules adopted by the SEC pursuant to Section 13(d), 
any person unable to certify that an acquisition of stock was made 
without an underlying intent to affect control must file a Schedule 
13D, even if a Schedule 13G had previously been filed.155 Like the 
statute itself and its legislative history, the rules allow for the broad 
application of section 13(d)’s private cause of action and disclosure 
requirements, an application extending well beyond tender offers and 
other contests for control. 
 Finally, despite the court’s unprecedented formulation of 
Section 13(d)’s implied private right of action, Mr. Edelson’s claim 
still fit within the new parameters set by the court.  The circumstances 
leading up to Mr. Edelson’s claim included the accumulation of stock 
by Messrs. Yip and Ch’ien directly before the election of 
Chinadotcom’s Board was to take place156 and the use of those newly 
                                                 
151 Edelson v. Ch’ien, 405 F.3d 620, 633 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e cannot look at 
the implementing regulations with the same authority as we do statutory language 
and legislative history in discerning whether Congress intended to recognize a 
private cause of action”). 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 n.18 (1979). 
155 See Rules 13d- (c); 13d-1(e)(1); See also SEC Amicus Brief, 2004 WL 
376075, at *30-31.  
156 Edelson, 405 F.3d at 622. 
30
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 15
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss1/15
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 1                           Fall 2006 
 
 439
acquired shares to oust Mr. Edelson from the Board157 without 
disclosing such intent to the shareholders.158  Obviously, the 
accumulation of stock by Messrs. Yip and Ch’ien was one that could 
affect corporate control.  In fact, such accumulation did affect 
corporate control.        
 
VI. THE BIG CHILL: THE EDELSON HOLDING AND THE SARBANES-
OXLEY ACT’S HEIGHTENED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REQUIREMENTS 
 
  Directors and officers of corporations are charged with a 
fiduciary duty of care,159 “which often manifests itself in the form of a 
monitoring function.”160 As a director, this monitoring function stems 
from the principle that all corporate affairs must be managed under the 
direction of the board of directors.161 “Courts and commentators 
interpret this monitoring duty to mean that directors, individually and 
as a group, have an oversight function.”162 Additionally, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 et seq., has codified a number of 
requirements there. By way of example, under Sections 301 and 302 
of that Act, corporate executives are required to implement and 
maintain internal controls, and provide an annual report speaking to 
                                                 
157 Id. at 623. 
158 Id. 
159 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985). 
160 Lisa M. Fairfax: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act as Confirmation of Recent Trends 
in Director and Officer Fiduciary Obligations, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 953, 955 
(2002).  
161 Id.; see Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.01(b) (“All corporate powers shall be 
exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation 
managed under the direction of, its board of directors….”); see also §§ 8.30(a) and 
8.42(a) (corporate directors must act in good faith and in a manner believed to be in 
the best interest of the corporation).    
162 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. at 955; see Model Bus. Corp. Act. § 8.30 (b) 
(directors must devote their attention to their oversight function); Briggs v. 
Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 147 (1891) (directors have a duty to supervise and manage 
corporate affairs); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 
1963) (directors have a duty to actively supervise and manage corporate affairs).    
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the viability and efficiency of that system.163 Further, Section 403 
amended the title of Section 16 of the Exchange Act to read 
“Disclosures of Transactions Involving Management and Principal 
Stockholders.”164 Presumably, this was done to specify the broad scope 
of disclosures that should be monitored by corporate executives. The 
need for corporate directors to actively monitor and seek information 
pertaining to corporate conduct has not been lost on the SEC either. 
The SEC, after investigating several directors, concluded that their 
general lack of knowledge apropos important company events 
“demonstrate[d] the need for adequate regularized procedures under 
the overall supervision of the Board to ensure that proper disclosures 
are being made.”165 
 Mr. Edelson was simply ensuring that proper disclosures 
were being made. He did so with an eye towards adequately 
performing his heightened monitoring duty as a corporate director. 
While Edelson did not directly address the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, its 
holding will likely have a negative impact on the heightened duty of 
Board members to oversee and monitor disclosures made by corporate 
executives and large shareholders. At the very least, it sends the 
message to Board members that monitoring disclosures and addressing 
probable inadequacies in certain disclosure may cost them their 
positions – a disincentive to scrutinize disclosures.              
 The Edelson holding has further negative implications with 
regard to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. §7201 et seq.  Under 
Section 406(c)(1)-(3) of that Act, senior financial officers, i.e. Mr. Yip 
and Mr. Ch’ien, are required to ethically and honestly conduct their 
business affairs, “including the ethical handling of actual or apparent 
conflicts of interest between personal and professional relationships” 
                                                 
163 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. at 969;  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-204, § 301, § 302, 116 Stat. 745, 776.  
164 See Sarbanes-Oxley § 403. 
165 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. at 970; Report of Investigation in the Matter of 
National Telephone Co., Inc., Relating to Activities of Outside Directors of National 
Telephone Co., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-14380, at *4 (Jan. 16, 1978), 
available at 1978 WL 171339 (noting that outside directors must maintain a 
familiarity with company documents and filings).  
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and full “compliance with applicable governmental rules and 
regulations.” A serious inconsistency arises then between the Edelson 
holding and Sarbanes-Oxley. By virtue of Edelson, senior financial 
officers of publicly held companies are encouraged to handle personal 
conflicts by accumulating large stakes in their company and ousting 
their foes, despite what may be in the best interest of the company and 
without the requirement that they disclose their plan to affect corporate 
control. This conduct can hardly be called ethical, but taken to its 
logical next step, the Edelson holding encourages such behavior.    
 There is yet another conflict between this holding and Sarbanes-
Oxley, specifically, section 1514A. That section encourages employees 
of publicly held companies to question the propriety and legality of 
decisions made by corporate executives by offering protection against 
any retaliatory action taken against them as a result of their inquiring. 
Mr. Edelson was presumably ousted for questioning the propriety of 
Mr. Yip’s buy-back plan, and the court took no steps to protect Mr. 
Edelson. The message this case sends to corporate directors is to stay 
quiet in the face of potential federal securities laws violations as 
corporate officers who bring up these issues will be ousted. The 
unfortunate result is that good corporate governance will be 
disregarded in favor of job security, and the heightened corporate 
governance requirements set forth in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will be 
eroded by the cases that follow the precedent set by Edelson. 
 
CONCLUSION 
    
 In deciding Edelson v. Ch’ien, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals should have reversed the district court’s finding that Mr. 
Edelson did not have standing to assert a private right of action under 
Section 13(d). Mr. Edelson had standing to sue both in his capacity as 
a shareholder and director. Further, the court erred in limiting the 
scope of Section 13(d) to issues arising solely in the context of a 
tender offer or other contest for control. The statute itself, as well as its 
legislative history and the rules adopted pursuant to it, lead to the 
conclusion that the disclosure requirements of Section 13(d) extend 
beyond the tender offer context. By limiting Section 13(d)’s remedy to 
33
Diomede: Say It Ain’t So!: How the Seventh Circuit's Holding in <em>Edelso
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 1                           Fall 2006 
 
 442
those actions arising out of tender offers, the court in Edelson v. 
Ch’ien unnecessarily narrowed the statute’s broad scope. Under the 
court’s construction of section 13(d)’s private cause of action, 
executive-stockholders of publicly held companies are all but 
encouraged to conceal their intent to affect change in a company’s 
management by filing a schedule 13G disclaiming an intent to affect 
control, vote their shares despite having concealed their actual intent, 
affect change in the company management, and walk away knowing 
that the manager or director that they effectively ousted has no 
standing to sue. Moreover, the holding in Edelson may have a chilling 
effect on the Board’s heightened oversight and monitoring functions as 
set forth in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and creates serious potential for 
conflict between circuits.       
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